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Seven to nine minutes of warning are planned for a ballistic missile attack, and three to five minutes are assumed for a cruise missile attack. Once inbound missiles are detected, standard procedures are to sound the Scud alert, notify subordinate units, don nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) protective masks and, except for watch-standers, head for underground bunkers.
Marines deployed north and east of the headquarters suddenly observe a lowflying missile passing overhead, pointed towards Kuwait in the direction of Camp Commando. IMEF's air defense computer terminals display nothing out of the ordinary, and no Scud alert is sounded. Marines in the headquarters are astonished and surprised to hear the signature of a low-flying jet engine overhead, followed by the noise and concussion from a large warhead blast.
An Iraqi Seersucker antiship cruise missile converted into a land attack role has just missed decapitating IMEF by a mere one hundred yards. The missile, launched from the Faw peninsula, flew undetected and unengaged straight through the heart of an alert and robust U.S. theater air and missile defense system. Following this attack, the U.S. 2 Currently, such an attack would likely go undetected, preventing U.S. forces from donning protective equipment and taking shelter.
During OIF, five Chinese-built CSSC-3 "Seersucker" antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) were launched by Iraq against land targets in Kuwait. The attack described above was the first. A second attack, using two Seersucker cruise missiles on 28 March, was aimed at ships at the naval base of Kuwait City. One missile homed in on a radar reflector, the other on a seafront shopping center. Two Seersuckers were also launched on 31 March-one at the port at Umm Qasr and the other at troops at Safwan. 3 Not a single one of these missiles was targeted or even detected in-flight.
Proliferation of land attack cruise missiles threatens U.S. force projection capabilities and requires joint development of a cruise missile defense system that can be integrated into and provide robustness to the combatant commander's theater air and missile defense system.
Definition
Generally speaking there are four types of cruise missiles-strategic, antiship, harassment drones, and tactical land attack. Consider just the land attack threat to the combatant commander.
Tactical land attack missiles (TLAMs) are designed to deliver conventional warheads with accuracies of 20 meters or less. TLAMs, and their air-launched cousins, the Standoff Land Attack Missiles (SLAMs), have the capacity to complement, and in some cases replace, manned aircraft in conventional missions. Furthermore, TLAMs can be outfitted to deliver chemical and biological weapons. There are few proven defenses against land attack cruise missiles. 4 
Current and Projected Threats
Iraq's use of cruise missiles during Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM, as well as the proliferation in cruise missiles, has expanded the Department of Defense's awareness of the threat and limitations in defending against it. The key to the success of cruise missiles is their stunning accuracy, ease of acquisition, and convertibility of easily obtainable technology.
In the Gulf War, the Al-Hussein-modified Soviet SS-1C "Scud B" missiles experienced a circular error probable (CEP) of 1,000 meters, meaning that half of the missiles fired landed within one kilometer of the target. 5 By comparison, the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile reportedly has a CEP of less than six meters. Cruise missiles can be seen as more dangerous than ballistic missiles for their accuracy and attack profile. While the cruise missile serves as an excellent conventional delivery vehicle, perhaps more important is its WMD threat potential. The cruise missile's aerodynamic stability makes it an inherently easier and cheaper platform from which to deliver and disperse chemical and biological agents, giving it a lethality factor more than 10 times greater than that of a ballistic missile for a given amount of biological agent. 20 When all aspects are considered, producing and deploying cruise missiles is cheaper and less complicated than establishing and maintaining a force of modern combat aircraft. 21 Cruise missiles are more concealable than aircraft, more effective in penetrating defenses, and, potentially at least, more accurate. 22 Cruise missiles can be launched from any angle, from the air, sea, or ground, and are proven to be more difficult to shoot down. A cruise missile attack would offer little warning before a strike. Cruise missiles such as Silkworm and Exocet are designed to fly at "sea-skimming" levels only a few feet above the surface to avoid radar contact. The Silkworm, the predominant of these variants, is the "Scud" of cruise missiles, available globally, manufactured regionally (Iran, Egypt, North Korea), with a range that has been extended to 400 km. 24 Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea have Silkworms and Seersuckers, a version of which North Korea now manufactures. 25 The Silkworm is 7.36 metres long, weighs 2,988 kilograms and can deliver a 513-kilogram payload. 26 It can be launched from semimobile (towed) launchers or from ships. The
Silkworm is the weapon of choice because of its range potential and simplicity of transformation. 27 The highly proliferated, less sophisticated Chinese variant of the Silkworm antiship cruise missile, can be modified for land attack missions with an extended range of up to 300 kilometers and improved guidance and navigation systems that are based on commercially available technology. 28 The Silkworm gained fame in the 1980s when it was used by both sides in the Iran-Iraq War; both countries were supplied by China. 29 China has exported several types of cruise missile systems to Iran, Iraq, and Libya, including long-range C-802 Silkworm missiles and shorter-range C-801 Sardine missiles. China also recently test-fired a 200-kilometer-range C-803 cruise missile. 30 Intelligence estimates offer foundation for the belief that the Silkworm or some variant will be the cruise missile of choice for either a nation state or lone group or actor seeking to conduct an attack against U.S. forces responding to instabilities in one of the emerging volatile regions in the world, or while meeting the challenges of the Global War of Terrorism.
Current Legacy Systems LACM Defense
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld sent a classified memo to the White House in 2002 that highlighted his concern over the proliferation of cruise missiles among hostile nations and urged an intensified government-wide effort to defend against them. 31 It goes without saying that cruise missile defense has become a top-level defense concern for the United States and its allies. Cruise missile detection is complicated because its radar signatures can be similar to those of friendly forces. The Pentagon relies on a patchwork of surveillance systems and an assortment of interceptors fired from land, sea, or air platforms for defense from cruise missile attack.
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Land-based Defense Systems
The U.S. Army owns the majority of the land-based air defense systems that are its principal deterrent against the cruise missile threat. Although the following analysis looks at commonly used land-based systems and missiles, the list is not all-inclusive.
The Stinger is the Army's short-range air defense (SHORAD) missile for use in brigade, division, and corps areas against cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, lowflying fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters. The Stinger is an infrared missile system that can be fired from the ground or from rotary-wing platforms. The missile homes in on the engine heat generated by the target of opportunity. The Stinger is fielded in multiple configurations-man-portable air defense systems, on the Avenger, on the Kiowa Warrior and Black Hawk helicopters, on the Bradley Linebacker, and on the U.S. Marine Corps light armored vehicle air-defense system. The Stinger's Block 1 upgrade improved accuracy and resistance to countermeasures; it is effective against both unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles, as well as against standoff helicopters in clutter. 33 Stinger's primary defense limitations include lack of connectivity to overhead surveillance platforms and inability for radar to see over the horizon, both of which severely limit its effectiveness against cruise missiles.
The first air defense system to consider is the Avenger, a lightweight, highly mobile surface-to-air missile and gun weapon system mounted on a Humvee. Avenger has a crew of two and is configured with two missile-launcher pods containing four Stinger missiles each. There is a forward-looking infrared receiver (FLIR), a laser rangefinder, an identification friend or foe (IFF) system, and a very high rate of fire .50-caliber machine gun (1,100 rpm). The Avenger is an all-weather, shoot-on-the-move system, which can be remotely operated from a protected position up to 50 meters from the unit. An A1
upgrade integration permits the firing of the new Stinger Block 1 missile. The A2 upgrade adds a digital slew-to-cue (STC) capability and an upgraded fire-control computer.
The STC capability accepts and displays aerial tracks from external radar sources and forms the foundation for future incorporation of a beyond-visual-range engagement capability. 34 Like the basic Stinger, the Avenger system's defense limitations are primarily an absence of connection with overhead surveillance platforms and an inability for radar to see over the horizon.
Another air defense system is Sentinel AN/MPQ-64, used in conjunction with the In 1990, the Patriot Advanced Capability version two (PAC-2) missile was hurriedly taken out of a testing program and placed into production for the Gulf War. The
Army had only three experimental PAC-2s available during this time frame. 37 In 1991, the PAC-2 was used in the Gulf War with mixed results. The PAC-2 was designed to detonate when it was close to a target. During the Gulf War the Scud missiles used by
Iraq often broke up in terminal flight phase, which made it difficult for the PAC-2 to target the missile warhead. at speeds up to five times the speed of sound, which causes both to disintegrate. 41 The PAC-3's small design allows the launcher to hold 16 missiles compared to the larger PAC-2 configuration that holds only four missiles. 42 The Netherlands and South Korea have both requested procurement of the PAC-3. 43 While the Patriot system has played a focal role in the Army's air defenses over the last decade, and although significant im-provements have been made, its effectiveness against the cruise missile is again limited by its inability to see over the horizon. Significantly, MEADS is interoperable, and therefore has access to sensors from other air defense systems. MEADS will give the ground forces a robust future air defense and will be a key element in providing the combatant commander joint interoperability required for an effective LACM defense.
Maritime Defense System
The U.S. Navy's strategy for defense against antiship missiles has always been based on arraying its most effective capability into a concept called "defense in depth."
This defense in depth concept is a layered system composed of the following five rings: Phoenix. An additional limiting factor for this capability is that Phoenix missile production has been stopped and upgrades canceled.
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The second ring consists of the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burkeclass destroyers, each with a very capable AEGIS missile defense system on board.
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The AEGIS detection system consists of the SPY-1A radar, which automatically detects and tracks air platforms more than 200 miles away. The Ticonderoga-class cruisers use their Tomahawk cruise missile launch capability, AEGIS antiair missile systems, AN/SQQ-89 undersea warfare system, and C4ISR suite to form the most powerful surface combatants in Navy service. 49 Despite this formidable array, should an enemy submarine sink an AEGIS-armed escort, the task force group's defense would be significantly degraded.
The Navy's third ring consists of the surface ship's own self-defense missiles, within NATO usually the Sea Sparrow, sometimes called the Improved Basic Point Defense Missile System (IBPDMS). The IBPDMS is old technology developed in the 1970s. It has a range of six miles, but its operational readiness is poor. 50 While this ca-pability can be valuable for fleet defense, its limited range keeps it from being able to contribute to defending land-based forces.
The fourth ring uses different countermeasures, such as the SLQ-32 electronic warfare systems and the Super RBOC (Rapid Bloom Onboard Chaff) for defense against the cruise missile. SLQ-32 is 20-year-old technology that has low operational reliability.
It has not received technology upgrades, and extended deployments have negatively affected maintenance schedules. Super RBOC shoots chaff (metal strips) into the atmosphere to distract missile radar. 51 Again, the effectiveness of the fourth ring depends on the technology installed on the respective ships and is focused on the fleet.
The fifth and final ring comprises the "last-ditch" weapons, because they involve very close interaction with the target. Two systems are the Vulcan/Phalanx Close In Weapons System (CIWS) and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). 52 The CIWS is a radar-guided 20mm machine gun that fires 4,500 rounds per minute. CIWS's radar tracks the incoming target and the outgoing bullet stream to automatically make aim corrections to hit fast-moving and maneuvering targets. CIWS systems have been installed on more than 400 U.S. warships since its first testing in August 1973. 53 The Phalanx has received continual performance upgrades and remains a viable last-ditch weapon for missile defense. RAM was developed in cooperation with the West German Navy in the 1980s and subsequently entered service in 1993. RAM with its 21-tube launcher has performed very well in testing; however, it has been installed on only 27 U.S. Navy ships. 54 The erosion of "Defense in Depth" components has left the Navy primarily depending on the AEGIS for defense against the cruise missile. While the Navy AEGIS system pro-vides significant fleet defense, its ability to support land forces can be severely constrained by the ship's ability to operate close to shore.
Airborne Defense Systems
The same limitations as those of the ground-based defense system apply to air- The above finding indicated that JLENS furnishes the over-the-horizon radar acquisition capability required for the air defense system to be effective against cruise missile attack. JLENS's joint interoperability capability adds to its utility as a viable air defense tool. JLENS is a significant advancement in air defense, but additional work must continue to ensure its ability to deploy with the fielded forces as well as its ability to defend the full extent of CONUS borders.
Despite these promising initiatives current land, maritime, and air defense systems continue to be limited in their abilities to perform cruise missile defense for combatant commanders.
Moving Forward on LACM Defense
DOD has acknowledged its lack of sufficient defense against cruise missile attacks, and is taking steps to correct the deficiency. Concurrently, enemies of the United
States are also aware of this weakness, and can be expected to exploit it.
The U.S. family of legacy systems to counter the LACM threat is not only incapable of handling the threat projected by 2010, it is also completely inadequate to work effectively against even the limited current threat. Even with enhancements to current systems, U.S. forces will not be able to provide a defense sufficient to protect key power projection access facilities such as ports and bases, and vital areas such as forward-based command and control centers.
A planned, synchronized attack against land forces by an enemy employing both numerous ballistic missiles and cruise missiles using GPS/GLONASS (GLONASS is the Russian version of GPS) for precise guidance and targeting would simply overwhelm current U.S. legacy capabilities. Adding simple countermeasures to hostile LACMs such as stealth and towed decoys only compounds an already challenging problem. Stealth reduces the radar cross-section of an already low-signature cruise missile, increasing the difficulty of detection and tracking. Use of towed decoys can create such a sufficient kill vehicle miss distance that the cruise missile can survive. The LACM threat today is similar to the submarine threat of World War II, a situation where a small number of relatively inexpensive German submarines were initially able to asymmetrically counter seemingly overwhelming allied sea power. The United States has maintained air superiority or even supremacy in all conflicts over the past half century, but that paradigm is not necessarily destined to remain a given assumption.
A senior planner for Operation DESERT STORM recently stated in Aviation Week and Space Technology:
The U.S. is not going to get the luxury of one cruise missile arriving every five minutes. If I were the enemy, I'd fire them in barrages. And I'd put dummies up front and at a little higher altitude to attract the defenses. I'll bet eighty percent would get through. The Navy is the only service with a viable close-in defense system (the Phalanx 20mm gatling gun).
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The kill chain to attack an LACM consists of detecting, identifying, tracking, and finally targeting the cruise missile. Each of these four phases is critical to success. For instance, if the cruise missile can be detected, tracked, and targeted with a weapon, it still has to be identified in order to prevent fratricide of friendly air assets. Consider the complexity of an air picture in which the blue force has several hundred manned and umanned aircraft airborne (both coalition and joint), has its own cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in flight, and is simultaneously trying to cope with dozens or even hundreds of threat cruise and ballistic missiles.
The key factor to successfully provide for cruise missile defense is the development of a robust and joint single integrated air picture (SIAP). Unfortunately, each of the Services continues to approach the LACM threat with a "stovepipe" mentality. Each
Service has its own vision for air defense, and an inherent and historical tendency to re- defenses, and hitting protected areas from the rear. 67 The large size of such radars has generated renewed interest in the use of lighter-than-air vehicles. One concept on the drawing boards is a tethered blimp stationed at 70,000 feet capable of remaining on station for a month and carrying a 4,000-pound payload. 68 The main problem with blimps is the difficulty in deploying them into theater due to their limited speeds. This has generated interest in alternate methods of deploying radars, such as using large-bodied aircraft or satellites.
Several concepts exist in the employment of radars aboard wide-bodied aircraft to perform LACM detection and identification. One method would be to upgrade current E-3 AWACs and E-8 JSTARs aircraft with advanced radar systems capable of tracking LACMs. Another is to use a palletized roll-on, roll-off radar system that could be placed aboard a multitude of aircraft found in the battle area. In the prosecution of air warfare, numerous large-bodied tanker aircraft are used for air refueling operations. Currently these aircraft spend numerous hours flying in assigned orbit patterns so as to refuel attack aircraft, but accomplish relatively little else. Placing radar sensors aboard tanker aircraft, and netting them into the BMC 3 system would add necessary robustness and depth to an LACM defense.
A robust joint single integrated air picture employing the concepts of network centric warfare and cooperative engagement can provide the necessary means to detect, track, and identify LACMs as well as a host of other aerospace threats such as helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ballistic missiles.
The final step in the process to defeat the LACM threat is the development of the kill vehicle or "interceptor." Of prime importance here is the necessity to develop kill vehicles that remain cost effective.
Currently the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile used by the U.S.
Army has a unit-production cost of two million dollars. The U.S Navy's prototype follow-on land attack cruise missile to replace the Tactical Tomahawk is estimated to have a unit production cost of only $40,000. 69 Although the Patriot is capable of killing cruise missiles its poor cost-per-kill against low-cost threats such as crude cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles makes it prohibitively expensive in the current cruise missile defense regime. "Adversaries could use cruise missiles to overwhelm U.S. defenses and deplete limited Patriot inventories," according to Defense Week.
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Currently, the U.S. Army is developing a low-cost cruise missile interceptor that relies on commercially available technology and off the shelf components. The Army estimates the cost of that interceptor to be in the $100,000 range. Flight tests are expected to begin in Fiscal Year 2005 (FY05), and low-rate initial production could occur as early as FY07-08. This interceptor, with a length of 14 feet and weight of 700 pounds, is expected to have a range of approximately 50 miles. It will use an active sensor and be netted to overhead sensors as it flies to target. It will climb to 70,000-80,000 feet before descending in its terminal kill phase. The Army's concept is that this low-cost intercep-tor will be used against unsophisticated cruise missiles (those lacking stealth and defensive countermeasures), while Patriot systems will be used to attack sophisticated LACMs. 71 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) hosts a low-cost cruise missile program in its special projects office responsible for developing an affordable missile seeker "for use in an interceptor system to defeat raids of unsophisticated air 2. DOD should aggressively employ technology to develop and deploy a robust 360-degree layered Joint Integrated Air Defense System (JIADS) capable of detecting, identifying, tracking, and killing LACMs, including LACMs equipped with stealth and countermeasure technologies.
3. DOD must ensure that the cost of the kill vehicles used is commensurate with the costs associated with threat LACMs. DOD can't go broke in the process and the fielded interceptors must be numerous enough to counter a robust threat.
Conclusion
Future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of our current ability to project military power overseas. Saturation attacks with ballistic and cruise missiles could deny or delay U.S. military access to overseas bases, airfields, and ports…. New approaches for projecting power must be developed to meet these threats.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 Sept. 2001 75 As the rest of the world struggles to find ways to counter the overwhelming military might of the United States, the allure of weapons such as the cruise missile will increase. The threat has been proven to be real even though it has not been effectively used against U.S. forces in major combat. In addition to the nation-states that pursue this capability to further their regional objectives, the United States must also be aware of the nonnation-state actors such as terrorists and criminals probing for soft, high-visibility targets.
The limitations of current U.S. legacy systems, whether employed from the air, land, or sea, create vulnerability for the combatant commander that must be aggressively addressed. Effectively, the technology and means exist to reliably counter the LACM threat, but the threat must be officially recognized and serious steps must be taken to deploy a functioning system by 2010. OSD must ensure that the Services work together to develop a JIADS capable of providing a single integrated air picture. Network Centric Warfare and cooperative engagement lead the way.
